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THE PERPETUATION OF VIOLENCE: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROHINGYA MINORITY CRISIS

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ABSTRACT

The Rohingya crisis started to make headlines mainly after the huge exodus that began at the end of August 2017. The security implications of this event are wide if we think that the civilians of the Rakhine state of Myanmar are highly affected by the confrontation between the two sides. There are often violent clashes between the parties generating huge numbers of internal displaced people (IDP). Bangladesh, as a neighboring country is both unwilling and unable to provide the proper humanitarian support for the refugees and the access of international aid is hindered by the action of the Burmese authorities. Myanmar used to be part of the British Colonial Empire until 1948. This paper explores the idea according to which in the case of the former colonized territories, the gain of independence did not put an end to the domination, repression and violence, but rather targeted particular minorities living on that territories. There was a power shift from one entity to another, with further perpetuation of domination, repression and violence. The system of domination and the acts of violence did not decrease after the state gained its independence; but it just moved from the imperial powers to the national ruling parties, which in many cases were autocratic.

KEYWORDS

- *Domination*
- *Peace*
- *Rohingya*
- *Minority*
- *Security*
- *Violence*

1. Introduction

The conflicts between states became very rare in the last seventy years, but this does not mean the world is more secure. The number of interstate conflicts declined, but the intrastate violence increased and this phenomena is backed by a series of quantitative data. For example, in 1993, *The SIPRI Yearbook* analyzed thirty conflicts concluding that from this number only one was intrastate in character (Amer: 1993, p.81). In addition to this, another relevant detail is that the acts of violence have taken place in the territories that have been former colonies (Henderson & Singer: 2000, p.257). In these circumstances, there should be no wonder why much of the attention of scholars of international relations has been directed to the security field, with a clear emphasis on what is usually called developing countries, especially on the former colonies. The present article will make no exception.

Focusing on the events occurring in developing countries, especially in the

former British colonies and starting from the idea that "the colonial violence is commonly accepted, or at the very least acknowledged, within the British imperial history" (Wagner: 2018, p.218) and that "plainly there were many brutal episodes in its [British Empire] history. Plainly, its authority depended ultimately (and sometimes immediately) upon the use of violence" (Bell: 2015, p.989), in the following pages I will analyze the assumption according to which, in the case of the former colonized territories, the gain of independence did not put an end to the domination, repression and violence, but rather targeted particular groups within the state. There was a power shift from one entity to another, with further perpetuation of domination, repression and violence. To express it even simpler: the acts of violence did not decrease after the state gained its independence; the power just moved from the imperial powers to the national ruling parties, which in many cases were autocratic. In order to verify the validity of this assumption I will use both theoretical tools and empirical facts.

The main instrument through which the scholars are analyzing the new security concerns is theory. The purpose of theory is to provide the proper tools in order to best grasp the reality. Even if we acknowledge it or not, every person uses theories in his/her daily life (Kolodziej: 2005, p.38). But the inconvenient of every theory is that it provides limited instruments: each is analyzing the reality from a particular perspective, prioritizing some facts and emphasizing certain explanations. While this is not necessarily a negative thing, it is better to understand it from the very beginning in order to be aware of the limitation of the research that is conducted. But since the use of theories helps us to best describe and understand reality, in the following pages I will engage in a cognitive process with the aim to test the validity of the proposed assumption by analyzing the Rohingya crisis using three theoretical lenses:

1. Michel Foucault's theory on the genealogy of knowledge (Foucault: 2003);
2. Judith Butler's idea of framing and the role of this process in perpetuating different perceptions (Butler: 2009);
3. Johan Galtung's perspective on violence (Galtung: 1969).

First, Foucault's theory of genealogy will help explain to what extent what is happening now in the state of Rakhine can be traced back to the colonial period, as these roots have been ignored to a certain extent. The fact that the Burmese authorities are using the historical argument about the inexistence of any real Rohingya ancestors, labeling this minority group as being illegal immigrants, is one example. Further on, based on the setting provided by the arguments brought up when applying Foucault's theory, I will employ Judith Butler's idea of framing to show how after Burma became independent, those who hold the power took advantage of their position in order to create and perpetuate a negative image of the Rohingya minority, an image of the *other*. As a need to endorse their position, the Burmese authorities had to picture the Rohingya minority as outsiders, depriving them of their basic human rights. The third theoretical enquiry specifically approaches the problem of violence. Thus, in support of Judith Butler's ideas, and in the same time as a continuation of her perspective, I will build on Johan Galtung's concept of violence, with an emphasis on specific forms of violence: direct, structural, manifest and latent violence. This final contribution will complete the analysis of the Rohingya population crisis which, as it will be shown, is not an isolated event in time that broke out in 2017, but it is rather a situation deeply

rooted in history and further exploited and exacerbated by the power structure.

The theoretical framework has its limitations. Foucault's perspective on subjugated knowledges is quite clear, but how can the reversed action – knowledge insurrection – be implemented appears to be problematic. In the same time, the tools provided by Butler seem to be appropriate in the case I chose, but it can appear difficult to notice it in a different situation because the line between the apprehension and recognizability can be highly blurred. As far as Galtung's theory is concerned, this appears to be appropriated in the selected case due to its capacity to point to all forms of violence existent within a society. However, its limitations are quite similar with those of Butler: closer attention must be paid to the way in which violence is perceived, because Galtung offered a clear theoretical perspective, but which in reality cannot be separated so easily. The article does not aim to provide any definitive answer to the intricate crisis of the Rohingya minority, but rather to add another contribution to the endeavor of understanding this particular case that is part of a larger picture.

Turning to the empirical facts, the particular case I chose to analyze is the crisis of the Rohingya minority. The situation of this minority started to make headlines mainly after the huge exodus that unexpectedly began at the end of August 2017. The security implications of this event are wide if we think that the civilians of the Rakhine state of Myanmar are highly affected by the confrontation between the two sides because there are often violent clashes between the parties, which have generated a huge number of internally displaced people (IDP). Moreover, Bangladesh, as a neighboring country is both unwilling and unable to provide the proper humanitarian support for the refugees and the access of the international aid is hindered by the action of the Burmese authorities (Holmes: 2017). The reason why I chose this specific topic is in close relation with the research I have been conducting in the past few months. In analyzing the ongoing atrocities from the Rakhine state, I first used the model proposed by Galtung, but with a focus on peacebuilding. A second research analyzed the status of stateless people that most of the Rohingya are in with a clear emphasis on the legal dimension. The third research I conducted on this topic analyzed the case from the perspective of the responsibility to protect doctrine, with the aim of providing an answer to the question regarding the need for an international intervention. The main preoccupation was gravitating around the question of who should take the lead in order to form a coalition that would be able to protect and to put an end to the atrocities directed against the Rohingya minority.

Each paper provided useful insights, but the intricacy of the case requires further research. In this regard I consider the theoretical framework proposed as one of the most complex and comprehensive up until now because it addresses both the possible causes of the crisis as well as the specific types of relations between the actors involved (based mainly on violence and denial of right).

2. The historical background

Around the year 1500 the European states were ruling 10% of the planet and 16% of its population. Until 1913, the eleven colonial empires that appeared during

history, were covering 3/5 of the world territory and 79% of the population (Ferguson: 2011, p.25). Drove by the economic advantages – both resources and commercial routes – the colonizers were often using violent means to conquer new lands and to maintain in power (Ferguson: 2011, p.48; Memmi, Sartre & Gordimer: 1991, p.47). However, by 1945 it was acknowledged that the colonial empires have to be dismantled. The effect was that between 1945 and 1960, over thirty sovereign states appeared on the international arena only in Asia and Africa (Office of the Historian: n. d.). The transition from one status to another was not smooth, neither peaceful in many cases, and this was also because of the conflicting relation between the two parties. On the one hand, the metropolises were not willing to give up their power, but on the other hand the vernacular populations were determined to gain their independence. This was the case for the State of Burma, currently known as the State of Myanmar.

Burma's colonial history has its roots in the 19th century. The British conquered the country in three wars: 1824-1826, 1852-1853 and 1885 (Topich & Leitich: 2013, pp:45-49). The state of Arakan/Rakhine became part of British Empire after the first Anglo-Burmese war, 1824-1826. This state hosts the biggest number of Rohingya ethnics. According to some historians, the roots of the Rohingya population in Rakhine can be traced back to the 19th century. After the peace treaty of the first Anglo-Burmese war, due to the population shortages, groups of individuals, mostly Muslims, have been encouraged to move from the region of Chittagong (nowadays situated in Bangladesh), but also from other Indian regions, to Rakhine (Chan: 2005, p.397). The land of this region was very fertile and the Brits wanted to take advantage of it by bringing people who can cultivate the land (Chan: 2005, p.399). The migrants were attracted, on the one hand because of the wages, and on the other hand because of their "hunger for land" (Chan: 2005, p.400). The process continued through the entire period of the 19th century and the 20th, as part of the British strategy of increasing production, but it ceased after the Burmese gained their independence in 1948.

If for the Burmese people 1948 is a year that makes them proud, for the Rohingya population this is the moment in which they became a target. During the struggle to gain their independence, the Burmese people allied with the Japanese, but the Rohingya Muslims remained faithful to the British rule (Arashpuor & Roustaei: 2016, p.385). It should also be mentioned that right after 1948, it is thought that the Rohingyas attempted to create a distinct Islamic state (Bodetti: 2017). This fact deepened the grievances between the Burmese and Rohingya. Seen as traitors, because they allied with the enemy, the Rohingya minority became one of the most persecuted groups.

At the internal level, the country is facing important problems regarding the ethnic disputes. With 135 ethnic groups (UN: 1999, p.6) and more than five religions (Aung-Thwin, Steinberg, & Htin Aung: 2018), Myanmar has always strived to reach peace. Its endeavors in this direction faced multiple challenges especially following the coup d'état that took place in 1962. Even if right after 1948 the state was embracing the path of democracy, the fragility of the new regime withered in a matter of years. After the coup, those in power made important steps towards an undemocratic regime; Burma sank in the waters of totalitarianism, the military junta becoming the ruling power in the state claiming that they had to stop the civilian prime minister to give

more power to the ethnic groups (Smith: 1999, p.195). From an administrative point of view, Burma is a federal union comprising seven states. However, the relation with the ethnic group from each state is not promising, military clashes being present in the North part of the country as well as in the South: "…members of various other ethnic groups also took up arms as they became increasingly frustrated with the central government's lack of investment in their states, along with increasing centralization and Burmanization" (Smith: 1999, p.192).

In the case I am studying, the struggle of the Burmese government to take Rohingya out of the country took the form of specific policies and violent actions (rape, destruction of property, forced labor). The new rulers deprived the Rohingya minority of their social and political organizations leaving them with almost no representation. The most important political measure was the 1982 Citizenship Law which created three types of citizenship: citizens, associated citizens and naturalized citizens (*Burma Citizenship Law*: 1982) and actually rendered the Rohingya people stateless. In this realm, the term *Rohingya* was also erased from the discourse, being replaced with that of *Bengali* which means illegal immigrant (Ullah: 2016, p.297). In 2015, the government issued a law that is aiming to protect the national identity of Myanmar. Labelled as laws for religion and race, these measures were imposing birth control, restrictions for Muslims to convert to Buddhism (even if they wanted to marry with a Buddhist man or woman) and outlawed polygamy (White: 2015, pp.9-20).

The combination between a totalitarian regime and the ethnic diversity within Myanmar generated multiple cleavages: on one hand we have the antagonism between the government and some ethnic military factions, and on the other hand we have the clashes between different ethnic groups. The case of the Rakhine State is an example of a mix between the two. The disputes across the ethnic groups (Rohingya – predominantly Muslims and Rakhine – predominantly Buddhists) existed before the military junta took the power, but they have been amplified after the coup.

Glimpses of democracy sparkled at the end of the `80s and the beginning of the `90s, but they were quickly dimmed by the actions of the military junta which, even if it allowed the organization of free elections, did not agree with their result: the transfer of power to a democratic government (Tonkin: 2007, p.33). One of the most important parties in the 1990s elections was the National League for Democracy (NLD), its main representative being Aung Sang Suu Kyi, 1991 Noble Prize Winner. The same party will play a crucial role 25 years later, in 2015, when, pressured by the international community, the military junta accepted the organization of a new round of elections in which NLD had a resounding victory. This can be considered one of the most important events in the history of independent Myanmar.

But even if the state of Myanmar experienced the transition from a totalitarian regime to a more democratic one, the changes for the Rohingya population have been minimal. Moreover, in light of the events that occurred during the last five years, the situation in Rakhine state is getting worse day by day. In 2012, a Rakhine Buddhist woman was raped and killed by three Rohingya men. The response from the Rakhine State authorities consisted in massive indiscriminate violence. In 2016, the atrocities between the Rohingya and Rakhine authorities amplified, the Rohingya militants, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), attacked three police stations killing nine

officers. ARSA was formed in 2016, the members being outraged by the actions of Tatmadaw (armed forces of Myanmar) against the Rohingya population. In 2017 a similar incident happened but to a whole new scale: ARSA attacked 30 police stations killing 12 officers (BBC: 2017). In retaliation to this, the Rakhine and central authorities declared the group as being a terrorist group and not an insurgent one (Mizzima: 2017). Moreover, they had a disproportionate response, leading some international officials to label the situation as ethnic cleansing (Westcott & Koran: 2017).

Knowing the situation of the Rohingya minority, there are opinions arguing that a systematic genocide is ongoing (Bodetti: 2017), as part of a process that began long ago, in the `60s. These assumptions are based on the direct, structural and cultural violence that the authorities of Myanmar and Rakhine employed towards this minority. In 2015, a group of peace researchers analyzed the Rohingya situation in accordance with the six stages of genocide proposed by Daniel Feierstein - stigmatization (and dehumanization); harassment, violence and terror; isolation and segregation; systematic weakening; mass annihilation; and, finally, symbolic enactment involving the removal of the victim group from the collective history – and concludes that the first four stages were reached (Green, McManus, & De la Cour Venning: 2015, p.102). In their report, the authors point to central and local authorities, making them responsible for the situation. During the 20th century, the Rohingyas were forced to flee Myanmar in five distinct phases: 1940, 1978, between 1991 and 1992 (~300.000), 2012 and in 2017 (over 600.000 since August 25th) (OCHA: n. d.) The latest one is considered to be the world fastest-growing refugee crisis.

3. Theoretical framework & analysis

Repression, violence, domination are concepts broadly analyzed in the field of international relations and most of the time in relation with the concept of power. The present paper is not an exception, but what is new is the theoretical framework that combines three different perspectives.

The first theory used is Foucault's idea of genealogy of knowledge and the relation with power. In his words, over time there has been a process of subjugated knowledges (Foucault: 2003, p.7). For the French philosopher the subjugated knowledges can be understood as "…historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations" and as "a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as non-conceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges" (Foucault: 2003, p.7). The subjugated knowledges are those local knowledges that have been left apart when the body of knowledge has been formed and this is because the former have been considered either unimportant in the moment of systematization of knowledge or because their scientific weight was insignificant. This idea ties up with the creation of history and the way in which we understand the past. Foucault argues in favor of a genealogy of knowledge meaning the actual process that helps to create the real knowledge in which all the components are considered. The genealogy of knowledge is the "treatment" for the subjugated knowledge inasmuch as the genealogy is looking at the entire spectrum. "[The]

genealogies are a combination between the erudite knowledge and what people know" (Foucault: 2003, p.8). Therefore, genealogy becomes the main instrument that tries to reveal the relation between power – understood as the institutionalized scientific system – and knowledges that the system is considering irrelevant – what is called subjugated knowledges. Foucault was calling the process knowledge insurrection.

The connection between Foucault's theory and the case of Rohingya crisis relies on the way in which the story about the crisis is told by those in power, thus, those who get the chance to engage in the process of systematizing the knowledge. The 1982 Citizenship Law is one of the examples. Without acknowledging the historical roots of the Rohingyas, the national government took their citizenship away. In their discourse the Rohingyas are illegal immigrants and not rightfully Burmese citizens (Ullah: 2016, p.297). It might be true that the Rohingya settled in Rakhine while the Burmese were already there, but they spent in the territory almost one century which in the present common understanding can be considered enough to get the citizenship of a state. Another example would be the formation of ARSA in 2016. One year later, in the light of the violent clashes between the government army and ARSA, the latter has been labeled as terrorist group. Without trying to explain the reason why ARSA was formed in the first place – justifications can be found in the massive violation of human rights: lack of freedom of movement, culture and religion, birth rate control, lack of representation rights (Armity: 2017) – the group has been identified with a terrorist group. No sovereign state will ever tolerate the presence of another military or paramilitary unauthorized force on its territory. And the same applies to Myanmar. Nevertheless, ARSA justifies its actions as being self-defense (Abuza: 2017). The main declared objective of the group is to protect the Rohingya minority from atrocities of the Buddhist majority that is oppressing the former for decades (McPherson: 2017).

If one starts the story of ARSA in 2016, the conclusion would resonate with the decision of the state to label the group as terrorists, but if the concept of genealogy (mainly knowledge insurrection) proposed by Foucault is applied then the conclusion might be different. Considering that the state failed to fulfill its duties to secure its citizens, and even more, transformed itself into an aggressor, then the creation of ARSA becomes less indictable. The fact that the subjugated knowledges are likely to have a political effect makes genealogy so urgent; "genealogy responds to and attempts to avoid the current `mode of functioning power`" (During: 1992, pp.126-127). More precisely, if the leaders of Myanmar would at least consider some of the complaints the Rohingya minority had and still has, then some political measures in response to these complaints can be implemented. The political measures do not guarantee that ARSA would have never emerged, but at least its total repression would be more justifiable. Nevertheless, the second theoretical perspective will be able to explain why the probability for the government to be engaged in a real genealogical process of knowledge formation was close to zero.

In her book, Butler analyzes war – "why and how it becomes easier, or more difficult, to wage war" (Butler: 2009, p.2). In order to find the right answer to this question she first analyzed the way in which the idea of life is normatively constructed in such a manner for us to be able to attain the epistemological capacity to apprehend and even more, to recognize a life. It is worth mentioning that to the normative perspective

of comprehending what a life is Butler acknowledges that there is also an ontological part, meaning that the normative does not create life, because life exists *sui generis*.

Presented as depending on a normative factor, life does not appear very promising. Nevertheless, focusing on the process of recognition, Butler is concerned not with the idea of squeezing *life* so to fit into a pre-existing normative framework, but "to consider how existing norms allocate recognition differentially. What new norms are possible and how are they wrought? What might be done to produce a more egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability? What might be done, in other words, to shift the term of recognizability in order to produce more radically democratic results?" (Butler: 2009, p.6). The existence of life is not reduced to the existence or inexistence of the discourse, but the recognition of life is. In other words, we all use certain frames in order to apprehend a life and to recognize it. But there is an important distinction between apprehension and recognizability. We apprehend that a life is, so is living, but if we do not recognize it, then it is not a life (Butler: 2009, p.8).

In the case of Rohingya, Butler's ideas are of particular importance due to the systematic process of framing. First, the state denied the historical roots of the Rohingya by calling them Bengali. Second, they created a purely normative frame that would deprive these illegal immigrants of their entitled rights: the Citizenship Law. Without being straightforward as Butler is in relating the normative frame with the idea of life per se, in the case of the Rohingya minority the normative frame is in relation with the status of citizen. But if we acknowledge that the citizenship is the bedrock of the rights one person can enjoy nowadays and for more than two centuries was the main argument of the individual when claiming his/her rights in relation with a nation state, then we can measure the judicial and political implications of this law with direct consequences for the apprehension and, more importantly, the recognition of life. The framework depicted by the law is a direct threat to the civil and political rights so to say, and an indirect threat to the human rights. The state saw itself responsible for the protection of its *citizens* and not the stateless, even if the fact that the Rohingya are stateless is a direct consequence of the measures taken by those in power. This way of seeing things has direct consequences for the lives of the Rohingya whose existence is threatened especially because they are stateless, thus unprotected. The Citizenship Law from 1982 is one example among many others which is able to describe the way the Rohingya minority faced a process of systematic oppression. The framing of this minority clearly states its position in relation with the Burmese majority. The fact that the Rohingya ethnics are stateless justifies the absence of any protection from the state or the respect of human rights. In addition to this, the existence a paramilitary group associated with this minority makes the violence against it justifiable, be it direct or structural violence (Galtung: 1969, p.169) present as either manifest violence or latent violence (Galtung: 1969, p.172).

As far as what violence means, I will use Galtung's theory. Even if he did not provide a clear definition of what violence is, in his analysis, he starts by relating violence with the idea of realization "…violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (Galtung: 1969, p.168). When there is the capacity to do something, but that capacity is mitigated by external forces, then violence is present.

These external forces can be displayed as either direct or structural violence. In the case of direct violence, the explanation is quite obvious: physical acts of violence. The examples can include domestic violence (man beating his wife or parents beating their children) and the extreme forms – war. In the case of structural violence, its presence is harder to be noticed. Structural violence is embedded in the economic, social and political systems the individual is living in (Galtung, Jacobsen, & Bran-Jacobsen: 2000, p.17). A difference between the two types is the level of perception: how easy does one type of violence appear more natural or more unacceptable. In peaceful or relatively peaceful societies the emergence of direct violence is very likely to appear as a shock, while structural violence is harder to notice due to the fact that it is present under different forms of social injustice (Galtung: 1969, p.173). Conversely, in societies where deep cleavages exist, the presence of direct violence still appears as negative, but the structural violence is not as hidden as in the previous case. In more dynamic societies the structural violence appears more evident (Galtung: 1969, p.173).

In addition to the two forms of violence already mentioned there are two other that will be used to illustrate the situation of the Rohingya minority. Manifest violence can take the form of either direct or structural violence. What is more relevant for our case is latent violence understood as "something which is not there, but might easily come about" (Galtung: 1969, p.172). Direct latent violence is present when a minor act triggers a disproportionate response, whereas structural latent violence is related with the constant threat of reintroducing disagreeable structures (Galtung: 1969, p.172).

For the Rohingya case, the direct violence is being manifested since the independence in 1948, but it amplified after the coup and it is considered to have reached its peak in 2017. In structural terms, the violence is also present and the examples start from inability to move freely, to the denied possibility to enter the high education system, or benefit from sanitary services (Amdur: 2013). The often-mentioned Citizenship Law falls also under the idea of structural violence. The peculiarity of structural violence is its *desubjectification* meaning that there is not a person to whom the violence can be attributed to, but the violence exists per se and it is preserved and perpetrated by the system. In the case of Rohingya, not the president, or the leader of the military or any other specific person was committing the act of violence, but the system as such; the way in which the system was build. Thus, the access of the Rohingya to the basic facilities such as education or healthcare is not denied by the professor or the doctor, but by the system which says that the members of this minority are not Burmese citizens, they are not entitled to benefit from the social services. The four laws regarding religion and race are also conclusive examples of structural violence. The new laws, instead of epitomizing the differences between the groups of the society, widened the gap.

An even more important and interesting form of violence in the case of the Rohingya minority is the latent violence. The crimes committed by ARSA are with no doubt condemnable. Questionable here is the response that came from the state. Not only that the inequality is measurable in term of capabilities, but the actions of ARSA triggered a massive response from the government which during the massive bombardments, it failed to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (International Crisis Group: 2017; Kelleher: 2018).

4. Conclusion

There is no doubt that the colonial empires had to come to an end because they were deeply illegitimate and perpetrated a system of dominance and repression. During the colonial period there were massive rebellions against the "alien domination and loss of sovereignty" (Young: 2001, p.161) and these rebellions became successful in the 20th century. Myanmar made no exception and its objective was fully accomplished in 1948 when it became independent. But the end of the colonial domination did not mean an end of the practices of domination within the new sovereign states. The main assumption of this paper was that in the case of the former British colonial territories, the gain of independence did not put an end to the domination, repression and violence targeting particular groups within the state.

For testing the assumption made in the beginning of this research I chose the case of Rohingya minority from the Rakhine state to which I applied three theoretical perspectives. Drawing on Foucault, I analyzed the manner in which power over the knowledge formation gives the government the possibility to disregard historical episodes. The subjugated knowledges in this case are the historical roots that the Rohingya have and their relation with the state of Myanmar. The ideal solution to this would be the knowledge insurrection proposed by Foucault, but the process seems utopian in the case of Myanmar and the reasons for this have been illustrated through Butler's concept of framing and Galtung's concept of violence (direct, structural, manifest and latent violence).

In line with Butler's model of framing I could observe how the government decided who is a citizen and who is not. This is not exactly what Butler states, but the argument is the same: while Butler speaks about the way in which frames are used to apprehend and recognize a life, the Rohingya case showed how the normative framing decided the legal status of the individuals, rendering Rohingyas stateless and in the same time depriving them from their basic human rights. Thus, the Citizenship Law did not decide the recognizability of a life, but of the citizenship, which in the present case is almost the same.

The third and last theoretical framing helped to show how and what kind of violence has been perpetrated across time against the Rohingyas. In strong relation with the previous theories, Galtung's perception of violence shows that the relation between the government and the Rohingya minority was based not only on direct violence, but also structural violence. While the direct violence varied during time, the structural violence constantly increased. The latent violence was illustrated through the last and most radical confrontation between ARSA and Tatmadaw.

In accordance with the theories used, the assumption made at the beginning is rather enforced. As the case of Myanmar shows, the system of domination, repression and violence was perpetrated after the country became independent. There was indeed a power shift, from the British imperial forces to the national authorities, but while the Burmese people thought of themselves as freed, other minority groups were rather "colonized". In the same time, the researcher has to be aware of the limitation of his research. Hence, this article was only able to analyze one case, and considering the example used, it would not be wise to extend the conclusion to the level of the

all former colonies. It would appear more accurate if each case will benefit from an in-depth analysis applying the theoretical framework proposed. One has to first analyze the manner in which the story is told so to understand the power relations embedded in the system. Second, the researcher is advised to analyze the existing rapport between the actors. Last, but not least, special attention has to be paid to the phenomena of violence and the different faces it is disguised. The understanding of the systematic perpetration of violence is crucial if we go back to Galtung definition of peace: "peace is the absence of violence". Thus, for starting a peace process that would have reasonable outcomes for all the parties implicated in the conflict, one has to understand violence.

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