Although we are no longer witnessing massive feminist marches on the streets, this is by no means the result of achieving gender equality. Since the end of the movement’s second wave, the presence of feminism as a topic on the public agenda has been less encountered. Instead, discourses, projects and policies which have gender equality as their main subject have become more popular in the last years. By discourses I refer to highly mediated speeches held by influential women from various fields: Cristine Lagarde (IMF 2014), Beyoncé (Shriver Report 2014) - pop singer, Emma Watson (HeForShe Campaign 2014) - actress. By projects I take into account strategies and campaigns drafted by organizations (from local and international NGOs to intergovernmental organizations) which have an interest in women’s issues and the inequalities determined by gender. By policies I designate the specific national and regional political strategies, laws and projects which aim at reducing gender inequalities. Thus, feminism has been replaced on the public agenda with the term ‘gender equality’. A cause for this can be found in the pervasive influence of the backlash against second wave feminism which has been spread over the
The whole term of ‘feminism’. The positive aspect of this apparent disappearance of feminism is that, given the complex history and the demands feminists have had over time, replacing this term with gender equality might lead to a better result, as it is easier to conceive its goals and this also moves away from the disputes maintained around a term.

In this context where feminism is a less discussed topic, Walby’s *The Future of Feminism* is a welcomed initiative to better understand why this is so, and also to get a better view of feminism’s possible future projects and forms. Sylvia Walby is well known for her analysis of gender relations, including domestic violence, the salience of patriarchy in the organization of society and in cultural customs, the economic and political measures.

The present article aims to examine the possible answers to the question ‘what is the future of feminism?’ starting from the paper *The Future of Feminism* by Sylvia Walby. It must be noted that at least two deficiencies can be found in the paper mentioned above: firstly, it presents fragmentarily important feminist related issues and also overlooks a detailed illustration of the third wave, which should be relevant for the future of feminism as it is specific to our present times and, secondly, many of the frequently used concepts are not clarified but presented as such (e.g. public gender regimes, neoliberalism). Furthermore, we can observe a tendency towards a social-democracy bias without adding concrete/statistical data to support this perspective - Walby’s prevailing manner to reinforce this bias is based mainly on the iterative refutation of neoliberalism. As I shall argue below, the bias is maintained also in regards to the future forms of feminism which is seen as inside the state feminism and generated by gender mainstreaming.

### Outside the state feminism

The future of feminism goes beyond the directions presented by Walby (national and transnational women’s organizations, gender mainstreaming) because her suggestions refer, mainly, to state interventions and recommendations made by transnational organisms (UN, EU) and also to the civil society which has the aim to continue the feminist tradition of contesting and bringing on the political discussion table, issues that women face in different environments. Walby does not take into account the importance of cultural models promoted by the mass media and by the new media. Thus, from her perspective, the future of feminism is summarized as the changes that various transnational and local decision-making actors and organizations will make (the interventionist path being preferred especially because social democracy is presented as the most complex and effective solution). The discourse is thereby limited to a macro level, ignoring the contribution of the subjects/beneficiaries in shaping the feminist agenda.

From the very beginning Walby redefines feminism in a broader sense than the one assumed by the first two waves “it is not considered necessary for a project to define itself as feminist in order to be included” (Walby: 2011, p.27) – this includes both the projects which aim to reduce gender inequality as well as the ones that promote the interests of women (Walby: 2011, p.2), but we not find in her thesis how did feminism - which emerged as a movement of protest against political power – end up being projected in the future as (almost entirely) a part of the mechanism that it has contested until recently (or that still continues to contest). Susan Faludi (2006, p.15) recalls that the feminist agenda is quite simple, although there are many disputes surrounding the term: feminism ‘asks that women not be forced to choose between public justice and private happiness’.” Walby
rarely mentions the importance of the private sphere - the problems generated by lack of
equality / justice within the family are not debated in the examined paper.

Given the fact that the main goals of feminism were different throughout its
history, the idea of „rise and fall of feminism over time” (Pilcher, Whelehan: 2004, p. 52) was outlined in the form of waves. Most theorists (Miroiu: 2004, pp. 56-86) prefer to
distinguish among three main waves: equality feminism (first wave), difference feminism
(second wave) and autonomy feminism (third wave). Third-wave feminism is considered
to be the most contentious one – both in definition, as well as in its detailed aims and
its various features – and this is correlated with the fact that its time of occurrence (late
80s – early 90s) overlaps with the period when postfeminism also emerged. Thus, it is
surprising that we do not find (at least not explicitly) the third wave among the future
plans of feminism. We should note, however, that Walby (2011, p. 19) puts the discussion
as follows: „is this a third-wave feminism or postfeminism?” although initially she
distinguishes between the two concepts as being opposed to each other. Furthermore,
we do not find a subchapter particularly allocated to the third wave, but this is brought
into discussion in the topic dedicated to postfeminism. There we can notice a haziness
of the discourse in regards to the two concepts - while at the beginning the third wave is
shown as a contemporary form of feminism of a younger generation, Walby then erases
the borders between the specific characteristics of the two contemporary movements
and states that the third wave allocates a central place to „the celebration of sexuality,
or its explicit and free exploration” (Walby: 2011, p. 19). This statement is taken out of
the classical context (as it is understood by contemporary feminists, namely the free
choice of sexuality, the rejection of discrimination based on sexual preferences and the
refusal of heterosexuality as the imposed norm) and associates it with „the hyper-culture
of commercial sexuality” (McRobbie: 2004, p. 259). One can assume that the absence
of the third wave from the analyzed paper is generated by the fact that it supports the
individual arbitrator and Walby (2011, p. 19) rejects individualism because „individualism
depoliticises, focusing on personal choices rather than political action”. The blurred
mixture of concepts is continued because starting from this point the discussion moves
on postfeminism, without making a clear distinction in the framework. Walby does not
explicitly reject the third wave as a future form of feminism, but chooses to cast the
subject into the shadows by interfering it with postfeminism.

If the third wave is vaguely presented throughout two paragraphs, Walby (2011,
pp. 2, 12, 19-21, 23, 25) allocates more space when examining postfeminism (also at a
minimal level) as she associates it with neoliberalism. The conflict between feminist goals
and neoliberalism is a constant presence in most feminist projects and theories, as „the
apparent non-sexist and non-racist language of self-esteem, empowerment and social
responsibility” (McRobbie: 2009, p. 29) masks in fact an attack on disadvantaged social
groups. Postfeminism denies the principles promoted by feminism, considers that it is
no longer necessary because the equality between women and men has been achieved,
„assumes that the most important battles have been won and that it is time to celebrate,
not contest, the new forms of gender relations” (Walby: 2011, p. 20). Walby, unlike Faludi,
does not consider that postfeminism is an attempt to re-domesticate women, but a way
to exploit them in the public gender regime by supporting economic independence and

1 In addition, they are integrated into the chapter ‘Challenging feminism’- and, contrary to expectations, the third
wave does not appear at all in the subchapter ‘What does feminism do’
exploitative neoliberalism instead of supporting the progressive form of social democracy.

Postfeminism forgoes the self-empowerment politics and claims of feminism and replaces them with „the right to self-expression” (Budgeon: 2011, p. 289). This new right intensively promoted by postfeminists and the media becomes the main motto in shaping the identity of today’s women. The self-expression right, however, is explored in a limited way and comes along with the encouragement to „embark on projects of individualized self-definition exemplified in the celebration of lifestyle and consumption choices” (Budgeon: 2011, p. 281). The over-sizing and „commercialization of choice” (Lazar: 2011, p. 46) in a postfeminist context masks the limitation of the term: choice is not promoted as equality / freedom of choice (as shown in Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities theory), but rather as choice in consumption practices and lifestyles and as a false freedom. The freedom of choice Walby rejects should be the one supported by the postfeminist model but, as it will be discussed below, she also rejects the choice defined by the capabilities theory. For Walby (2011, p. 158), the prioritization of choice represents an obstacle to social democracy because it reaches its absolute dimension on the market field and not the state.

Faludi (2006, p. 86) notes that the advertising industry encourages the pseudo-emancipation of women and „disguises the freedom to consume as genuine autonomy”. The autonomy promoted by postfeminism is determined by the fact that „patriarchy has produced desires in women to want the very things that patriarchy needs them to choose” (Hirschmann: 2007, p. 151). Hirschmann refers to this subversive elaboration of women's autonomy as „oppressive socialization” that leads to their false impression that they act freely and autonomously when in fact, women are not the ones which set their preferences and goals. Walby does not discuss autonomy (according to feminist or postfeminism theory) and this absence can be associated with the fact that „autonomy is a central concept to most liberal theory” (Moller Okin: 2004, p. 1544) and also with the fact that many feminists considered the liberal theory as a masculine one.

A key element that must be taken into account when talking about the future of feminism is its popularization through popular culture, mass media and new forms of media - Walby’s argument omits this aspect: the first two are considered neoliberal influences and new media is vaguely presented as an element that will strengthen the community of feminists (Walby: 2011, p. 132). Since third wave feminism and postfeminism are contemporary, both can use the new means of communication. If postfeminism was from its very beginning promoted by the media, the third wave has not reached the same level far popularity - here the movement is deficient because it does not combat the stigmatization of feminism by using the same mechanism. The feminist clauses need to be spread to a larger audience and here the range of media channels is becoming more and more diverse.

An essential aspect for the future of feminism is precisely its comeback (in a realistic overview) on the media scene. The self-presentation of feminism is necessary because otherwise other attempts to undermine feminism will perpetuate its presentation as irrelevant, as a thing of the past or as a threat to the integrity of men. We need to promote feminism and its clauses in the mass media environment which addresses the general public so that women themselves to establish their ideals and desires because, otherwise, most women will use half measures. Nussbaum (2002, p. 127) stresses the importance of spreading feminist ideas: „women often have no preference for economic independence
before they learn about avenues through which women like them might pursue this goal; nor do they think of themselves as citizens with rights that were being ignored, before they learn of their rights”.

The narrative technique characteristic to the third wave can be easily embedded in mass communication, especially by involving some famous personalities, even the ones associated with the postfeminist circle and promoted by magazines and the beauty industry (celebrities who do not declare themselves anti-feminist or postfeminist, but rather are presented as pop culture icons). As examples in this regard we can count Emma Watson’s speech at the launch of the UN campaign HeForShe (counting over 6.5 million views) and the study *The Shriver Report: A Woman’s Nation Pushes Back from the Brink* which combines serious research with the narrative discourse of gender specialists (e.g. Carol Gilligan), of politicians (Hillary Rodham Clinton), and also of international pop figures (Beyonce Knowles, Eva Longoria). When shaping the future of feminism, Walby forsakes the media and the mass culture as that the two industries are, in her point of view, irrevocably linked to the neoliberal and postfeminist circle. Although she dedicates a significant part of the analyzed paper to the intersectionality challenge, she does not take into consideration a hybridization regarding the communication process: pure feminist content through media channels and pop culture icons, even though these seem to belong to the postfeminist realm.

Walby (2011, p. 64) frequently recalls the importance of the fact that we are dealing with a global feminism but does not take into account (or throws into the arms of postfeminism) the fact that we live (at least in the global north – on which her discourse focuses) in a consumer society that influences both the options/individual behaviors and also the political agenda (through the lobby of various industries). Nussbaum (2002, p. 128) does not omit this aspect when she states that “preferences are constructed by social traditions or privileges and subordination. [...] Women have often been socialized to believe that a lower living standard is what is right and fitting for them, and that some great human goods (eg education, political participation) are not for them at all”. Without considering feminism as a topic on the mass-media/consumer agenda, based on the A-T-R model (awareness-trial-reinforcement) (Le Roy Wilson: 1992, p. 309), one cannot hope that feminism and its goals will be achieved because the institutionalized form proposed by Walby rather transforms feminism into a niche policy with few actors - politicians or experts.

Feminism must be made popular to both women and men, regardless of their environment, class, education or political preferences, especially in regions or countries where we meet an underlying assumption that women benefit from gender equality. Since the accessibility to these media channels is questionable for those people living in extreme poverty, the impact of mediatization will be limited, but it can contribute to the dispersion at the common sense level of these messages. The fact that Walby ignores these methods of promoting feminism can be explained by her preference to see feminism as projects that are supported by the state or transnational bodies. She reduces outside the state feminism to civil society and the initiatives started by various non-governmental organizations.

The re-framing of feminism proposed at the beginning refers not only to broadening feminism (its transformation into multiple projects) and intersectionality, but also to the transition from feminism against the political power to feminism within the state, where feminism’s main goal – gender equality – becomes an objective for policy-makers. Walby
emphasizes that feminism is no longer just a movement of protest, but rather develops in various forms, thus entering the institutions of political power. These new forms, institutionalized, are no longer the subject of intense media coverage (hence the impression that feminism is dead, that has disappeared and that belongs in the past) unlike the protest movements that “intrinsically seek to be noticed by the public” (Walby: 2011, p. 52). The feminist projects integrated into the state are both the “outcome of, and at the same time a challenge to, older notions of feminism as a protest movement situated outside of political institutions” (Walby: 2011, p. 61). These changes (the re-framing) should be understood as a “shift away from being simply oppositional and towards more involvement with the government” (Walby: 2011, p. 74).

The shift from the autonomous, contesting forms of feminism to the increased engagement with the state is the result of the fact that traditional feminist movements organized as a protest against the institutions of power (Walby: 2011, p. 79) generated changes in the latter - increasing the share of women in these institutions, which led to an endorsement of women’s interests within political power.

Inside the state feminism as gender mainstreaming

Arguably the most intense discussed topic in The Future of Feminism is the one related to gender mainstreaming which is described as the institutionalization of feminist projects in order to eliminate gender inequality, a specialized tool in the political world and a feminist strategy (Walby: 2011, p. 99). Elsewhere, Walby (2005, p. 321) highlights the fact that, even if it “encapsulates many of the tensions and dilemmas in feminist theory and practice”, gender mainstreaming does not try to establish a separatist gender theory.

The term first appeared in 1991 in the discourse of the European Commission but it was adopted in 1995 (Pollack, Hafner-Burton: 2000, pp. 435-436) and only after that this new approach was brought to the forefront by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. In 2010 the European Commission defined the concept as the “integration of the gender perspective into every stage of policy processes - design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation – with a view to promoting equality between women and men” (EC in Walby: 2011, p. 87).

Previously, in 1998, the same institution had highlighted that gender mainstreaming must be made “by the actors normally involved in policy making” (Walby: 2011, p. 87).

In an overview of the tensions which surround the conceptualisation, methods and agents involved in the process of gender mainstreaming, Walby (2005, p. 339) reminds that the first one – the conceptualization based on inequality and difference - is also specific to “the heart of social and political theory of the state and democracy”. Walby does not focus on an explicit account of the methods employed in the process of gender mainstreaming, but these can derived from the agents involved in drafting such policies. The presence of political representatives is implicit, but insufficient. Thus, the involvement of experts (both academics and bureaucrats) is crucial in the shaping of gender mainstreaming.

In The Future of Feminism, Walby (2011, pp. 91-92) brings into discussion the question of these agents - experts or politicians - arguing that the process of gender mainstreaming lies between the expertise of specialists and the political representatives, to which she adds a third mandatory element - the civil society (Walby: 2011, p. 95) which has the role to support from the outside of the decision making field any further changes aimed at eliminating gender inequalities. The first section of this article is also relevant for this
triangle of agents involved in gender mainstreaming, as civil society is often present in the public sphere and is engaged in a dialogue with mass media and other citizens. Such a dialogue will not be stimulated if most citizens consider that gender equality is a claim of the past or if they consider that traditional gender roles are fixed and/or fair. The complementary approach detailed above does not contradict Walby’s conceptual frame, as she also includes grass roots movements both in the generic future of feminism, as well as in the process of gender mainstreaming (Walby: 2005, p. 338).

Another debate on gender mainstreaming is generated by the way it should be set: as agenda setting or as integration. Walby (2011, p. 10) argues that the process is often seen as the integration, meaning its incorporation in the political decision making, and not as a re-configuration of the political agenda. Agenda setting requires a transformation of the existing political paradigms, changing the decision-making process and reconfiguring the goals of those policies (Walby: 2011, p. 82). The integrationist approach does not dispute the existing political paradigm, but rather adds the gender perspective within it, and therefore has greater chances to be accepted. While most feminists have supported the agenda-setting version, the implementation of the project is done through incorporating gender in the existing coordinates. In support of this remark, Teresa Rees argues that the European Union has adopted the integrationist version instead of rethinking its goals from a gender perspective (Pollack, Hafner-Burton: 2000, pp. 452). On the other side, the integrationist approach is less challenging and thus has fewer chances to lead to the achievement of the two goals of gender mainstreaming as identified by Woodward (2003, p. 66): the transformation of gender relations and gender-sensitive policy making.

Moreover, Walby (2011, p. 57) accepts gender mainstreaming as the institutionalization of women’s voices, as part of the already established agenda and as „the incorporation of a gender perspective on all economic matters”, although she previously acknowledged that this accent on economy becomes the sole objective, thus minimizing the importance of „sharing family responsibilities between women and men” (Walby: 2005, p. 325). This aspect is underlined by Conrad Winn (1985, p. 37) - when referring to intervention policies for equal opportunity on the labor market - who states that low involvement of women at the workplace should not be blamed on gender discrimination (explicit or implicit) made by the employer (hence the emphasis placed by the new policies on representative quota is insufficient) but rather that differences at the workplace are due to unjust family burdens.

From the perspective of the European Commission definition, gender mainstreaming does not imply the assumption of uniformity between women and men but considers that the differences should not be treated as an obstacle (unlike affirmative action) - hence the major importance placed on equality in the labor market: equal pay, access to all professions, increasing the number of employed women, etc. Bringing difference to the forefront takes place in other fields (Walby: 2011, p. 88) and involves childcare support. About the issue of similarity / difference, Mosley (2005, p. 53) points out that we should abandon equal treatment for equal consideration of the relevant differences because the first makes from equality of opportunity an abstract principle and not a reality. What is defective in the model proposed by the European Commission mentioned above is that it attempts to reconcile family and work in the lives of women without considering a change in the way that men are part of the two fields. Although Walby (2011, p. 84) recalls this critique of the transformative policies (i.e. M. Stratigatki 2004), she does not develop a possible improvement of the model.
Winn (1985, p. 44) considers that the reduction of inequalities on the labor market is not sufficient because „the most intractable impediment to income equality is inequality in the home, specifically the heavy and unequal responsibilities for child-rearing”. Moreover, the focus on opportunity in employment has the effect of increasing inequality between working class women and middle class ones, the latter being favored by such policies, while the first are not and risk even to suffer a decrease in income if the in the traditional family where the husband is the one who brings the only income is disfavored by policies that support women. Winn (1985, p. 40) underlines that policymakers must take into account that „the family, not the individual, is the bearer of social class”, thus being needed a shift from the emphasis on the individual to the focus on the family, because the latter „transmits status from generation to generation and because spouses reinforce each other’s class position” (Winn: 1985, p. 40). Although Walby supports social democracy (and rejects any liberal or neoliberal influences), she does not take into account neither the family nor the class, let alone the family as a basic element of the class.

It is interesting to note that while Walby (2011, p. 89) says that gender equality in the EU can be achieved by combining gender mainstreaming with specific actions, she does not allocate space for discussing this second technique. Affirmative Action appeared in the United States before the term gender mainstreaming was even coined. Its initial form supported equal treatment, without discrimination based on sex or race. Subsequently, the project was amended so as to raise the number of women and people of color in higher education and on the labor market, being also called positive discrimination, reverse discrimination, equal employment opportunities. Unlike gender mainstreaming, the goals targeted by affirmative action were clear, often numerical and it has been debated whether or not these goals were limited to quotas.

Affirmative action was often presented as the opposite of equal treatment (formal equality - in the terms of Amartya Sen). Since the purpose of affirmative action is not formal equality, but substantive equality (Lederer: 2013, p. 34) - which allows preferential treatment, we can observe a compatibility (at least conceptually) with the capabilities approach, which „is concerned with correcting the focus on means rather than on the opportunity to fulfill ends and the substantive freedom to achieve those reasoned ends” (Sen: 2009, 234). Substantial equality includes two forms of equality: of outcomes and of opportunity. Taking into account the critiques of affirmative action, we can say that it has prioritized equality of outcomes through imposed numerical quotas – which was also put into light by Teresa Rees, who states that affirmative action shifted the focus on equality of outcome (Pollack, Hafner-Burton: 2000, p. 433). Equality of opportunities focuses on the distribution of equal prospects in order to obtain those opportunities, thus allowing a preferential form of treatment for the underprivileged. As Mosley (2005, p. 56) stresses, contrary to the intentions of equality, identical treatment rather „perpetuates than eliminates determined social disparities”. Therefore, equality of treatment is different from equality of opportunity, and, on the contrary, the first can lead to the undermining of the second.

For Iris Marion Young (1990, p. 195) „equality is sometimes better served by differential treatment”, and thus policies such as affirmative action intervene in the oppression process. She argues that the aim of these projects is not the compensation for past discrimination, but rather to diminish the current biases of the institutions and decision makers. She argues that this vertical division is falsely supported by the principle of meritocracy and that „merit is a myth” – the promotions to higher positions are not
made based on skills, but, often, on the impressions that subordinates determine on those from the hierarchical peak. In this context, Marion Young counteracts the attacks on affirmative action based on the argument that the latter stimulates inefficiency and under-qualification. However, affirmative action limits its main objectives to public inequalities and does not question the inequalities met in the family.

Walby recalls that the EU programs fall under three categories regarding how to lead to gender equality: those that use equal treatment / same standards for men and women; those that focus on difference and support the different activities of women and men such as childcare - which can lead to an adaptation of women to the men's environment (Sarikakis, Thao Nguyen: 2009, p. 205) - and those that want a change/transformation of the first two and „to reconcile work and family life” (Walby: 2011, p. 89). The transformative vision based on the idea that while women and men may be equal in certain areas (employment, education), they are also different in others. The three models listed above were called „the equal treatment perspective’, „the women's perspective’, and „the gender perspective’ (Walby: 2011, p. 85). Teresa Rees claims that the European Union has adopted all three visions (Pollack, Hafner-Burton: 2000, p. 432), but there are others who do not completely agree on this evaluation. Walby highlights the fact that the reduction of gender inequality is possible precisely by combining the three perspectives, as they are not mutually exclusive and are not equivalent, but complementary – we can interpret this either as an acceptance of the situation, or as a refusal to criticize the integration project of gender mainstreaming.

Walby does not bring these aspects into question, nor does she consider the following: if equal treatment leads to the perpetuation of inequality of opportunity and if gender mainstreaming has no results and no concrete agenda - as Stratigaki (2005, p. 178) claims that, on the contrary, gender mainstreaming emerged as a method to counteract gender affirmative action - how can we consider the future of feminism as an institutionalized form of requirements with feminist orientation but which does not have a clear formulation nor a mechanism for implementation, monitoring and evaluation?

Moving forward into the details of this topic, we must take into account Alison Woodward’s observation that there is a frequent confusion between equal opportunity, affirmative action and gender mainstreaming. A source of this confusion can be found in the definition of gender mainstreaming given by the OECD, which focuses, however, on equal opportunities for implementing gender mainstreaming, and considers that affirmative action does not lead to the shaping of capacities, institutions and systems that would result in the full implementation of gender mainstreaming (Woodward: 2003, p. 83). Woodward underlines that equality of opportunities in the EU refers mainly equal opportunities in the labor market and that we should not consider gender mainstreaming as something limited to employment (or as a balance between work and family) because it should be a transformative process (Walby: 2011, p. 67).

We should not omit, however, that gender mainstreaming has not been initiated at national level, but at regional level - within the European Union. An essential coordinate for the present and future of feminism is exactly its global / transnational form (not necessarily universal). If at the European Union level the gender perspective is one of the main elements, subsequently it became part of the UN goals. Given the larger size of the United Nations, gender mainstreaming has gained a different form here, trying to cover global issues of women, such as violence and physical integrity (which became
part of the human rights). Gender mainstreaming is not limited, therefore, to policies/ recommendations directed at labor, but takes into account the different situations in which women from different regions find themselves - which is consistent with the third wave of feminism. Walby does not make this association and it is not clear if this happens because the third wave is the implicit storyline of her paper or because she relates in another way to the differences to which this wave refers to (see above the misunderstanding sexuality/ sexualisation).

As the title of this section of the paper suggests, gender mainstreaming is a form of inside the state or institutionalized feminism, as its main goal is to achieve gender equality and to create policies that will lead to this result. By institutionalized feminist goals I refer to political projects which are inspired or are the aftermath of protests and marches organized by feminists in the past. Essential for the institutionalization of feminist goals is the presence of women among the policy and decision makers, situation which was not encountered at the beginning of feminist social movements.

If institutionalized feminist goals - taking the form of gender mainstreaming – have resulted in the recognition of women and of their experiences (some generated precisely by ‘difference’) as the subject of human rights (explicitly), their weak point is exactly the excessive theorizing (yet unclear) and also the deficient implementation (Walby: 2011, p. 99). This entanglement derives from the fact that gender mainstreaming has its roots in feminism, understood as a social movement, and in feminist theory, representing the academic frame, both being inextricably bound to the sameness/difference dilemma. In this regard, Walby (2005, p. 321) recalls that gender mainstreaming „involves the reinvention, restructuring and rebranding of a key part of feminism in the contemporary era”.

The critics of gender mainstreaming

Among the critics of gender mainstreaming the most important is due to the flexibility of the term and the confusions arising from it, and it has been outlined that the term might „become a container concept, where every user fills it with a different meaning” (Woodward: 2008, p. 295). Walby (2005, p. 322) is aware of the contested meanings associated with the term, since it involves two dualist frames „gender equality and mainstream agendas”. In connection with this, Stratigaki rejects gender mainstreaming (in favor of affirmative action) because it „became an abstract principle used interchangeably with the principle of equality” (Stratigaki: 2005, p. 175) but it is not clear what kind of equality: of resources, of treatment, of welfare, etc. Frequently it has been debated the fact that gender mainstreaming in the EU is understood as equality of opportunities (Sarikakis, Thao Nguyen: 2009, p. 205), but not in the broader sense considered by the followers of the capabilities approach, and such limitation of the term leads to the perpetuation of the masculine paradigm. Furthermore, while some specialists consider gender mainstreaming as being different and complementary to affirmative action and equality of opportunity, others contend that the first term actually includes the last two.

The second critique refers to the possibility of abandoning gender affirmative action in favor of the new solution (especially that „mainstreaming” tends to be associated with other coordinates). The transition from „the female perspective” to „the gender perspective” raises the question of prioritization: „if gender is everybody’s responsibility in general,
then it is nobody’s responsibility in particular” (Pollack, Hafner-Burton: 2000, p. 452). An important difference between gender mainstreaming and affirmative action is given by the fact that the latter is a short term process whereas the first is designed to be used without a deadline (Woodward: 2008, p. 294) - hence the difference in regards to the measurable results: without a clear program established in a timeframe, without resources and fixed goals, gender mainstreaming fails precisely in proving its effectiveness. Stratigaki argues that while the results of affirmative action programs were directly measurable and had effect in a relatively short time, gender mainstreaming does not have this feature. She claims that the great weakness of gender mainstreaming is „its most important innovative element - the broadening of the scope and relevance of gender equality to all policies in the effort to transform them” (Stratigaki: 2005, p. 169). Moreover, given the new issues on the agenda of European policies on migration and racism, there is the threat that the gender dimension will be abandoned/ postponed in favor of other policies (Woodward: 2008, p. 296).

Another critique concerns the way in which the new gender coordinates are administrated (Walby does not stresses this deficit) – EU recommendations are soft law instruments (they are not mandatory and do not provide penalties) and this will lead to the unequal implementation of gender mainstreaming in the member states. Pollack and Hafner-Burton conclude that within the European Union, when evaluating the effectiveness of this new dimension one should make it from three different angles: at the supranational level of the European Commission bureaucracy; at the intergovernmental level of the Council which proposes policies and at the national level of each member state (Pollack, Hafner-Burton: 2000, p. 437), especially in the context of the expanded European Union. Moreover, the implementation of gender mainstreaming is closely linked to the political framing of the initiator agent: as noted by Pollack and Hafner-Burton, the more oriented towards state intervention on the market an organization is, the higher the chances of accepting the goal of gender equality (Sarikakis, Thao Nguyen: 2009, p. 203). Taking this aspect into consideration, we cannot apply gender mainstreaming to a global scale as liberal and neoliberal followers will not support this project.

Distribution within the family and the capabilities approach

For Walby (2011, p. 141), the way in which gender equality can be achieved is dictated by social democracy, where human rights represent just an element within it (this reduction to a simple element cannot be attributed to the fact that human rights comprise a certain liberal individualism). Although EU policies support the reconciliation of work and family life (which, however, is a questionable goal since men do not need this balance), their implementation often is resumed to bringing women into employment in the same terms as men (Pascall, Lewis: 2004, p. 382). Among the flaws of social democracy, Pascall and Lewis identify the fact that it insists on bringing women into paid employment and does not take into account transformative policies that would determine men to do the unpaid work in the household. What Walby overlooks in The Future of Feminism, although taken into account in a previous article (Wably: 2005, p. 325), is that the policies that are limited to combining work and family through improving the conditions for women so that they could do them both are limited and ineffectvie policies (Pascall, Lewis: 2004, p. 383). Gender mainstreaming must reestablish here the political agenda, otherwise these policies
will perpetuate the existing inequalities since it only corrects some of the effects but does not address at all the triggering factor of inequality / oppression - the family. On this issue Walby (2011, p. 131) does not use the same argument based on which she minimizes the importance of human rights, namely the fact that they focus on the individual not on the community, but chooses to ignore the fact that gender mainstreaming has a non-interventionist component which might interfere with the complete change of gender roles.

The fact that in the past thirty years women have acquired increasingly more managerial positions in trade unions, universities, politics actually represents the root of the new equality demands in the institutionalized form. Walby (2011, p. 57) claims that these changes have led to a focus on redistributive issues but, as it will be shown, this redistribution is limited to economic resources situated at the macro level, ignoring the dynamics of distribution within the basic institution of society. Setting the equality discourse on public sphere / employment falls into the effect noted by Sen (1992, p. 16): demanding equality in one space can lead to be anti-egalitarian in some other space. A simplification of the demands of equal incomes ignores the real opportunities (the capability to choose and the effective power to do and be) because the actions are not limited to the material part, but also have as their fundamental element the capacity to use them / transform them into the desired results (Sen: 1992, p. 28).

The future of feminism described by Walby focuses on the empowerment of women and not on their victimization, thus putting on a secondary place the oppression within the family and although she reviews the capabilities approach, her analysis is limited to Sen (and only to reject his claims), Nussbaum is not taken into discussion - this absence will be tackled below. The capabilities approach provides a better explanation of the inequalities of power (and, hence, of income). We may associate the rejection of this approach with the fact that capabilities „emphasize the importance of individual freedom” (Alexander: 2004) and for Walby the latter is an element associated with neoliberalism which she considers an enemy for feminism. Capabilities include the available opportunities and choices that would lead to meaningful human lives (Alexander: 2004) - see the discussion above concerning choice. Moreover, Moller Okin (2003, p. 291) notes that Sen tends to focus more on freedom than on capabilities, thus enhancing the chances of rejecting the whole theory.

The capabilities approach offers a broader depiction of unequal family relations because it understands that capabilities are caused by „distribution within the family” (Alexander: 2004). Although it is a distributive theory, the capabilities approach succeeds in reaching the main elements of the care ethics precisely by recognizing that human beings are not always independent. Merging capabilities with care ethics has been initiated by Martha Nussbaum and the fact that this is not considered in Walby’s thesis can be explained justified exactly because Nussbaum’s model is more suitable for women, but she is a liberal feminist – the latter does not support interventionist methods such as those proposed by Walby. We can not ignore the fact that women are the main caregivers of the helpless (children, elderly, people with disabilities etc.) and that their work within this framework is done without payment or recognition that this is a valuable service. Nussbaum (2002, p. 134), although being a supporter of liberal feminism, insists that a fair society should provide „care for those in a condition of extreme dependency without exploiting women and thus without depriving them of other important capabilities”
such as leisure, employment, etc. The fact that most policies which seek to achieve equality between men and women revolve around regulations concerning education and equal payment is underlined by Moller Okin (2003, p. 286) when she asserts that „internal distributions are irrelevant to economists” who consider that women are „the perfect altruist” when they dedicate to household activities and care. Sen and Nussbaum have rejected the evaluation of well-being based on the economic growth precisely for these reasons. The capabilities approach, thus, offers a more comprehensive understanding of gender based inequalities. Unfortunately, as well as gender mainstreaming, it does not propose a well sketched method to redress these inequalities.

Distributive inequalities within the family do not limit to the fact that women spend more time dedicating themselves to others, but also include the fact that men tend to retain a part of their own income (often larger than that of their female partner) for their own use – mainly consumption vices and other women (Moller Okin: 2003, p. 305). In this context - lower income, higher responsibilities and imposed altruism - equal treatment is indeed ineffective and perpetuates the already existing inequalities. The problem of the internal distribution within the family can be tackled through an interventionist approach – but one that is not limited to state support through public day nurseries and other childcare support methods, such a limitation would result in accommodating women to the men’s environment and does not intervene, for example, in problems generated by work in the household (Moller Okin noted that, in fact, women face the triple day of work, not the double day: paid work, childcare, household maintenance). If care will not be brought to the forefront of transformative policies, then „gender equality will belong to the better off” (Pascall, Lewis: 2004, p. 385).

Pascall and Lewis (2004, p. 378) underline that the redistribution of care work in the household is a crucial component for any future model, every kind of distributive theory must analyze the distribution between households / families but also within each of them. The model proposed by the two authors is a transformative one: two employees - two caregivers (dual earner - dual carer) and supports the change from 1.5 wages resulting from 1 + 0.5 (where the half belongs to the woman) to 0.75 + 0.75 wages (Pascall, Lewis: 2004, p. 386). This change of the dynamic of income within the family could be made through the implementation of a shorter and more flexible work schedule for both women and men (with an emphasis on the latter). Essentially, this model implies equal treatment, but this is possible only after a major change which can only be achieved through preferential treatment.

The gender inequality problem can also be placed outside the distributive theories. As Elizabeth Anderson (1999, p. 312) stresses, if inegalitarians argued for a social order based on human hierarchy, this means that, in fact, inequality does not refer to the distribution of goods but to the relations between people – between those considered superior and those subordinated. According to Marion Young, oppression (seen as the true basis of inequality) has five faces: „marginalization, status hierarchy, domination, exploitation and cultural imperialism” (Anderson: 1999, p. 312) and the struggle against it must be made on all five fronts. Moreover, as reminded by Moller Okin (2004, p. 1558), the

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2 For example Gary Becker, whose *A Treatise on the Family* proposed two economic models: the gendered division of the household labor - based on the assumption that a Pareto efficient family will allocate women’s time to the household and men’s time to the labor market - and the altruist model - based on the presupposition that a family member (the husband) will be altruist towards another member (the wife) as his utility positively depends on the welfare of the other
first contact with oppression takes place within the family and children are socialized in this context. Socialization in an oppressing environment (within the family or/and in a male-biased cultural form) lead to considering this as the normal state of affairs and, besides the acceptance of gender inequality discussed above, also contribute to considering sexual harassment and violence as something normal with which women have to deal with on a daily basis.

Marion Young (1990, p. 192) considers that injustice „should be defined primarily in terms of the concepts of oppression and domination, rather than distribution” because the latter version leads to the perpetuation of the hierarchical division of labor. She rejects the shaping of policies such as affirmative action based on distributive theories because they strengthen the current status quo („the white male bias”) and cause minor changes. According to Anderson (1999, p. 288), the goal of equality is „the elimination of oppression - which is socially imposed” and not the adaptation to a (re)distributive method.

Conclusions

Although it offers a fresh perspective on the future of feminism and a restatement of the concept, Walby’s argument is incomplete. Besides presenting diffusely the third wave of feminism, sometimes mixed with postfeminism, she removes from the coordinates of the outline the promotion and popularization of feminism since she considers that mass media and its consumer culture belong definitively and permanently to the neoliberalist realm. The feminist claims have to be fulfilled mainly by the projects within the state and transnational entities but this does not take into account the fact that men need to become acquainted with the feminist demands. Thus Walby leaves uncovered the part from where most of the opposition comes from – the family. Her perspective is utopian by the fact that it is inflexible when it comes to political preferences, often rejecting solutions and complementary approaches on the basis that they have liberal elements. Precisely here The Future of Feminism turns out to be contradictory: the two methods of eliminating gender inequality, namely social democracy and gender mainstreaming, limit their intervention to the public field. The interventionism proposed by Walby does not apply to privacy, no models of reconfiguring the family are proposed – and thus even the proposed social democracy incorporates some elements that belong to classical liberalism. The main project for the future of feminism is embedded in the state in the form of gender mainstreaming (inside the state feminism), but it is favorably described, lacking a critical analysis which could have provided possible improvements to the weaknesses pointed out by other theorists.

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